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Abstract We introduce and analyze the following variants of the Borda rule: median Borda rule,
geometric Borda rule, Litvak’s method as well as methods based on forming linear combinations
of entries in the preference outranking matrix. The properties we focus upon are the elimination
of the Condorcet loser as well as several consistency-type criteria.
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1. Introduction
In a paper delivered in the French Academy of Sciences in 1770 Jean-Charles de
Borda introduced a point voting system, nowadays known as the Borda Count (BC, for
brevity), for electing best candidates in multi-member voting bodies (Borda’s memoir
has been translated into English and reprinted in Black (1958) as well as McLean and
Urken (1995)). Borda’s proposal was speciﬁcally designed to replace the then (and
now) widespread plurality rule which gives each voter one vote and elects the candi-
date with larger number of votes than any other candidate.
Despite its initial success in the French Academy, BC has not been widely used
in elections involving candidates. Some critics have pointed to BC’s vulnerability to
strategic voting especially under circumstances where voter groups have information
about the popularity of various candidates. Others have taken issue with BC’s failure
to guarantee the election of an eventual Condorcet winner, i.e. a candidate who is not
defeated by any other candidate in pairwise comparisons. In more recent times, the
signiﬁcance of the latter failure has been called into question (Saari, 1995).
Our focus is on some variations of BC in settings involving decision making by
expert groups. The setting is admittedly a special one and ignores the wider context
in which most group decisions are made. So, questions like who determines the set of
alternatives or criteria to be used in comparisons are overlooked. Similarly, we do not
consider strategic behavior by the individuals. Our focus is more narrow, but nonethe-
less important. We deal with various conceptualizations of the notion of “socially best
alternative” or “the most defensible collective preference ranking of alternatives”. We
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shall look at BC variations from the viewpoint of improving upon BC: are the varia-
tions signiﬁcantly superior to BC in expert group choice settings? As an example of
such a setting is the choice of projects to be funded by a funding organization (e.g. EU)
on the basis of their evaluation by a group of experts (referees). We are considering
ways of utilizing the expert information in richer ways than today is often the case in
funding organizations where the experts are asked which applications are acceptable
or which are the best. Some of our criteria also pertain to decentralized settings where
the experts form subgroups each considering the same set of applications. Some other
BC variations have been discussed in an earlier article (Nurmi, 2007).
The relevance of the following discussion extends wider than group choice settings.
To wit, all of what is going to be said regarding experts or voters can be translated
into another setting involving multiple performance criteria. Substituting criteria for
experts or voters we can discuss multiple criterion decision problems using the same
techniques. Hence even decision settings where one decision maker is assigned the
task of selecting best projects or other alternatives using several criteria of evaluation
fall within the range of our discussion. The main assumption to be made is that the
evaluation of the alternatives on each criterion allows for ordinal measurement. This
is a quite common setting since typically only part of the criteria can be measured by
ratio or absolute scales of measurement. Hence, the aggregation problem involving
ordinal measurement is frequently encountered.
The setting which we are focusing upon – i.e. the choice by a set of experts – is in
fact more in line with what the founding fathers of social choice had in mind than the
election of candidates to political ofﬁces. Condorcet and Borda were preoccupied with
jury decision making, i.e. a setting where one aims at a correct choice assuming that
each decision maker has some expertise in the issue to be decided. Also C. L. Dodgson
was interested in non-political decision making: awarding scholarships to students in
Oxford colleges of the 19th century (Black, 1958). In these settings it is quite natural
to assume that the experts, judges, referees or evaluators are able to form a priority
ranking over the applicants or alternatives and the task is to aggregate those rankings
into collective ones in a logically defensible manner. Since the experts, referees, judges
etc. are expected to use their speciﬁc expertise in forming their opinion on the decision
alternatives at hand, it is very important that the information provided by the experts is
aggregated in a way that is non-arbitrary and satisﬁes plausible criteria of consistency
and adequacy.
Among ordinal aggregation methods BC provides a useful benchmark in utilizing
fully the information contained in preference or performance rankings. Many other
methods – e.g. plurality or antiplurality rules – use only partially the information given
in rankings. We will use BC itself as a kind of benchmark method among the posi-
tional systems, i.e. among rules that determine the “electability” of an alternative on
the basis of its average position in the experts’ preference schedules. The way the so-
cial preference ranking is determined on the basis of the individual rankings is very
straight-forward in BC: each rank position is assigned a value in a scale so that the dif-
ference of values of two consecutive positions equals unity. Prima facie, it is a logically
defensible method. BC or slight variations of it are used in Eurovision song contests,
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making nomination proposals for the ofﬁces of university chancellors, bishops etc. In
political elections, BC is used in the Paciﬁc island state of Kiribati.
In a way, BC is well-suited as a benchmark system among the positional ones since
it provides a neutral and anonymous treatment of all rank positions and individuals.
Unless one has a speciﬁc reason to put more weight to some positions or individual
judges, this seems a reasonable way to proceed. That BC may end up with Condorcet
failures – i.e. not rank the Condorcet winner ﬁrst in the collective preference – may
then come as an unpleasant surprise. Hence, one might look for ways of improving
the performance of BC by making some modiﬁcations in its operating principles. And
indeed, more than a hundred years ago Nanson proposed a system that guarantees the
choice of an eventual Condorcet winner while otherwise exhibiting the crucial features
of BC (Nanson, 1883). It later turned out that the improvement came with a cost:
Nanson’s rule is non-monotonic, while BC is monotonic. In other words, in Nanson’s
method an improvement in an alternative’s ranking, ceteris paribus, may worsen its
position in the collective ranking. This is not possible under BC.
Observations like this made us curious: are there any positional systems “close”
to BC that would improve upon its properties while retaining its plausible features?
Since BC is based on arithmetic average positions of alternatives, we ask whether BC
modiﬁcation in terms of geometric averages would be an improvement. Similarly,
we ask whether replacing averaging by looking at median positions would improve
the performance of BC. These are but two possible modiﬁcations of BC which are
intuitively “close” to BC proper. Together with results on other BC variations, our
results, summarized in Table 10, suggest that BC is indeed superior to its modiﬁcations
among positional systems.
We start by introducing the notation and basic deﬁnitions. We then deﬁne the
modiﬁcations of BC to be studied. The criteria of evaluation of the modiﬁcations are
then discussed.
2. Preliminaries
A preference aggregation problem is a triple A = (N,X,RN), where N is a nonempty
ﬁnite subset of natural numbers N = {0,1...}, X is a nonempty ﬁnite set, and RN =
(Ri)i∈N is a proﬁle of preferences Ri on X. A preference R on X is a binary relation
satisfying transitivity (xRy and yRz implies xRz) and completeness (xRy or yRz for all
x,y ∈ X). As usual, we denote the membership relation in this context by xRy instead
of (x,y)∈R. The strict part of a preference R is denoted by P (xPy iff xRy and not yRx),
and the indifference is denoted by I (xIy iff xRy and yRx). A preference R is strict or
linear, if xRy and yRx implies x =y, for all x,y∈X. We denote the set of all preference
aggregation problems (or simply problems) by A .
An interpretation of the model is that N is the set of agents, X is the set of states of
alternatives, and xRiy means that agent i prefers at least weakly the alternative x to the
alternative y.
An aggregation rule is a function f such that f(A) is a preference on X for each
aggregation problem A ∈ A . The interpretation is that f(A) is the social preference
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representing the tastes of the of the agents in the problem A. There is no shortage of
aggregation rules. For example, let d(A) be the least index in N for any aggregation
problem A, and deﬁne f(A) = Rd(A). This is one form of a dictatorial rule. The
celebrated Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that all aggregation rules, satisfying a
set of apparently plausible axioms, are dictatorial. Arrow formulated his theorem for
problems with a ﬁxed set N of agents, but the result can be extended to the domain of
problems with variable agent sets.
Given a problem A = (N,X,RN) ∈ A , let bi(x) = |{y ∈ X | xRiy}|, for each i ∈ N
and x ∈ X. Then bi(x) is the number of alternatives y that in i’s opinion are at most as
good as x, in a given problem A (the dependence of bi on A is not explicitly displayed






for each x ∈ X, for each A = (N,X,RN) ∈ A . We may call bi(x) the Borda point given
to alternative x by agent i. Then fB(A)(x), the Borda score of alternative x, is the
average of individual Borda points. Sometimes the Borda scores are deﬁned by taking
the sum of individual Borda points, and sometimes the Borda point bi(x) is deﬁned
as the number of alternatives that are strictly worse than x. Often the Borda rule is
deﬁned only for problems with linear preferences. For all practical purposes these
different variants of the Borda rule are the same.
Given a problem A = (N,X,RN) ∈ A , let n(x,y) = |{i ∈ N | xRiy}|, for each x ∈ X,
for each A = (N,X,RN) ∈ A . Then n(x,y) is the number of agents in the problem
A who prefer x to y at least weakly (the dependence of n(x,y) on A is not explicitly






for each x ∈ X, for each A = (N,X,RN) ∈ A . This means that the Borda score of the
alternative x is actually the average number of individuals who weakly prefer x to y,
as y runs through the alternatives in X. A simple way to see that equations (1) and (2)
are equivalent is the following. Let ˜ Ri be an |X|×|X| matrix whose rows and columns
are indexed by members of X, and whose (x,y)-cell ˜ Ri(x,y) is 1 if xRiy and 0 other-
wise. Then bi(x) = åy ˜ Ri(x,y) is the number of 1’s in the x’th row. Therefore by (1),
fB(A)(x) = (1/n)åiåy ˜ Ri(x,y). This is the same as constructing ﬁrst the outranking
matrix ˜ R ≡ åi ˜ Ri, the sum of the ˜ Ri-matrices, and then taking the average of the cells
of the x’th row of the outranking matrix. But this in turn is fB(A)(x) as calculated in
equation (2).
Instead of taking arithmetic averages of the Borda points bi(x) or the numbers
n(x,y) as in (1) and (2), we could take the medians or geometric averages of these
numbers. Given an m-dimensional vector y (or an indexed set {yi | i ∈ I,|I| = m}),
the median of M(y) of y is calculated as follows. Index the coordinates of y by the
numbers 1,...,m so that yi ≤ yj if i ≤ j, i, j ∈ {1,...,m}. If m is odd, then m = 2k+1
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for some k ∈ N, and M(y) = yk+1. If m is even, then m = 2k for some k ∈ N, and
M(y) = (yk +yk+1)/2. The geometric average G(y) of the coordinates of y is G(y) =
m √
Õiyi, if all numbers yi are nonnegative, where Õiyi is the product of the numbers yi.
For all problems A = (N,X,RN), let b(x) be the vector (bi(x))i∈N and let n(x)
be the vector (n(x,y))y∈X. Applying the median, we deﬁne the rules fMb and fMn
by fMb(A)(x) = M(b(x)) and fMn(A)(x) = M(n(x)), for all x ∈ X, for all problems
A = (N,X,RN). Applying the geometric average, we deﬁne the rules fGb and fGn
by fGb(A)(x) = G(b(x)) and fGn(A)(x) = G(n(x)), for all x ∈ X, for all problems
A = (N,X,RN).
Another variant of the Borda count is obtained upon considering again the |X|×|X|
outranking matrix ˜ R of the problem A and focusing on the smallest entry on each
row. This is obviously the minimum support an alternative receives in all pairwise
comparisons. The order of those minima gives us a ranking over all alternatives. More
formally, denote the entry on the row x and column y by ˜ R(x,y). For each x ∈ X let
rx = miny ˜ R(x,y) and Mm(A) = {x ∈ X | rx ≥ rz,∀z ∈ X}.
Thisisthewell-knownSimpson-Kramermaximinrule(Simpson, 1969; Kramer, 1977).
Other variations can easily be cooked up. Following the intuition that in decision
theory goes under the name Hurwicz’s rule, we can ﬁx a number a ∈ [0,1] and deﬁne
for each x ∈ X (Milnor, 1954):
rx = maxy ˜ R(x,y) to get h0(x) = arx+(1−a)rx.
Then, the choice set can be obtained as:
H(A) = {x ∈ X | h0(x) ≥ h0(x),∀z ∈ X}.
In other words, one maximizes the weighted sum of maximum and minimum entries
on each row. With a =1, H(A)=Mm(A). Obviously, both Mm(A) and H(A) allow for
ranking over all alternatives, so a social preference can be formed. Both utilize essen-
tially less information about voter preferences than the Borda count and its geometric
average variation.
A choice method devised by Litvak (1982) is very much in the spirit of the Borda
count. Consider two individuals and their rankings over X. The individuals disagree
about the priority of the alternatives to the extent their rankings differ. One way of




The values of the dis measure range from 0 to å
k
i=0[(k−1)−(2i)], where k is the
numberofalternatives. Litvak’smethodlooksforaconsensusrankingoveralternatives
that is closest to the expressed opinions (ranking) of individuals in the sense of the dis
measure. To wit, given a preference proﬁle RN of n voters, deﬁne the distance of a
ﬁxed ranking R and RN as follows:




| bj(x)−bI(x) | .
where bI(xi) denotes the Borda points assigned to x by the ranking R.
Let R be the set of all rankings over k alternatives. Given RN, Litvak’s method
results in R ∈ R where
L(A) = {R ∈ R | dis(R,RN) ≤ dis(R0,RN),∀R0 ∈ R}.
Variations of Litvak’s method can easily be envisioned. For example, the city-block
metric could be replaced by the Euclidean one. Or, one could focus only on the ﬁrst
rank of the consensus ranking and sum up, for each alternative, the difference between
the alternative’s position and the ﬁrstrank. This variation, however, leads usback tothe
Borda count (Nitzan 1981). This shows not only that with varying consensus proﬁles
and distance measures one is able to construct different methods, but also that choice
rules can be expressed in several ways.
Further variations are based on certain entries in the outranking matrix, such as
two smallest and two largest ones, two entries closest the the mean one etc. Similarly,
the weights assigned to various entries can be varied to end up with new variations.
Instead of deﬁning these largely ad hoc rules, we shall focus our analysis on the rules
explicitly deﬁned above. Our basic interest is in ﬁnding out whether any of these can
be considered an improvement over the original version, viz. the Borda count.
3. Properties of Borda variations
3.1 Eliminating Condorcet losers
Arguably the primary motivation for BC was the fact that it never elects the eventual
Condorcet loser in the reported proﬁle. In other words, whenever the proﬁle expressed
by the voters contains an alternative that would be defeated by all other alternatives in
pairwise majority comparisons, this alternative is not the BC winner. Had Borda been
introduced to the median Borda count fMb, he would, therefore, have been largely
unimpressed since it turns out that this system may end up with a Condorcet loser. The
following 7-voter proﬁle is illustrated in Table 1. Here B is the Condorcet loser and is
at the same time the fMb-winner.








114 AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 2, no. 2More Borda Count Variations for Project Assesment
Let there be k alternatives and n voters. When all voter preferences are strict and
the number of voters odd, we can form a k×k matrix T = [txy], x,y ∈ X, of 0’s and
1’s so that a 1 in row x and column y means that alternative i is preferred to alternative
j by more than 50% of voters. Otherwise, the entry is 0. If n is odd and all voter
preference strict, txy = 1 implies that tyx = 0 when x 6= y. Thus, the number of 1’s in T
is w = k×(k−1)/2.
We now show that the median Borda system fMn based on outranking numbers
does not result in an eventual Condorcet loser being elected.
Proposition 1. Let n be odd and all preferences strict. If T contains a row x so that
åytxy ≥ k/2, then the Condorcet loser cannot win if fMn is used.
Proof. The proof is immediate upon observing that if the number of 1’s is at least k/2,
the median entry in row x of the corresponding outranking matrix is strictly larger than
n/2, while the median entry on the row corresponding to the eventual Condorcet loser
is strictly less than n/2. Hence, the Condorcet loser is not chosen when the fMn system
is used. ￿
Proposition1establishesasufﬁcientconditionfortheCondorcetlosernotbeingchosen.
The next proposition shows that whenever there is a Condorcet loser, the condition is
satisﬁed.
Proposition 2. Assume that n is odd and all preferences are strict. If there is a Con-
dorcet loser in the problem A=(N,X,RN), then there is a row x such that åytxy ≥k/2.





txy ≤ k×(k−1)/2 = w.
But this must be satisﬁed as an equality by the deﬁnition of w. So åytxy ≥ (k−1)/2
and there is no Condorcet loser, a contradiction. ￿
The maximin method, in contrast, may end up with a Condorcet loser, as shown
in the example of Table 2. Here D, the Condorcet loser, gets the minimum support of
14 which exceeds that of all other alternatives. Litvak’s method can also lead to the
choice of a Condorcet loser (Nurmi, 2004, p. 9).
Consider now the maximax method, i.e. a method that results in the choice of the
alternative with the largest maximal element in its row in the outranking matrix. It
is apparent that whenever there is a Condorcet loser in the observed proﬁle, it cannot
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be elected under the maximax method. This follows from the deﬁnition of Condorcet
loser. Since it is defeated by a majority by every other alternative, this means that every
other alternative has a larger element in its row than any element in the Condorcet
loser’s row. Consequently, the latter cannot win.
Now, since the maximin may lead to the choice of a Condorcet loser, while the
maximax method never ends up with one, it follows there are Hurwicz type methods,
i.e. ones based on weighted average of the minimum and maximum entries on each
row of the outranking matrix, that necessarily exclude the Condorcet loser and also
methods of the same type that may choose the Condorcet loser.
Consider next the method of forming the social preference by comparing geometric
averages of either the rows of the outranking matrix (fGn) or the Borda points given to
alternatives by the voters (fGb). It turns out that the Condorcet loser may be selected
as the unique socially best alternative by both methods. Take a look at Table 3, where
the strict preferences of nine voters over ten alternatives are depicted.
The alternative F is a Condorcet loser, every other alternative beats it by votes 5 - 4.
So the row of the 10×10 outranking matrix corresponding to alternative F consists of
nine 4’s and one 9 (F is at least as good as itself in the eyes of all voters). The product
of these numbers is therefore 49×9. The other rows of this matrix consist of the whole
numbers from 1 to 9, the number 5 appearing twice. The product of these numbers is
9!×5. Since 49×9>9!×5, the Condorcet loser is on the top of the social preferences
when geometric averages of the rows of the outranking matrix are compared, i.e. when
the fGn rule is used.
Now bi(F)=5 for all voters i, and the product of these numbers is 59. For all other
alternatives x the Borda points bi(x) are all natural numbers between 1 and 10 except
5. So the product of Borda points for all alternatives x 6= F is 10!/5. Since 59 > 10!/5,
the Condorcet loser is on the top of the social preferences when geometric averages of
the Borda points of alternatives are compared, i.e. when the fGb rule is used.
3.2 Consistency-related properties
The properties we shall focus upon are separability (Smith, 1973), consistency (Young,
1974), faithfulness (Young, 1975) and positive involvement (Saari, 1995, p. 216).
Separability requires that if two voter groups V1 and V2 both prefer alternative a to
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alternative b, then so does the combined group V = V1 ∪V2. Moreover, if one of the
group preferences is strict, this is also the case for the preference of V.
Consistency states that if two disjoint groups of individuals,V1 andV2 when choos-
ing from the same set of alternatives X, choose the same alternatives X0 (and possibly
some others as well), then the group V = V1 ∪V2 should choose X0. Young points
out that consistency is a version of Pareto optimality for subgroups since X0 only is
preferred to all other alternatives by the subgroupsV1 andV2 considered as individuals.
Faithfulness is an intuitively compelling property (Young, 1974). It states that if
the voting body consists of only one individual, then the social preference ranking is
identical with the individual’s preference ranking. Now, if a system is both faithful and
consistent, then it also satisﬁes unanimity or Pareto condition, i.e. in proﬁles where all
individuals agree on the ﬁrst ranked alternative, this alternative is chosen.
A procedure is positively involved if, whenever a is chosen by V, it is also chosen
if a group of voters, with identical preferences so that a ﬁrst ranked, joins V.
The above properties are pretty close to each other, but by no means equivalent.
Saari (1995, p. 218) shows that any scoring rule that is faithful and consistent is also
positively involved, but not all faithful and positively involved scoring rules are con-
sistent.
It is known that BC is faithful and consistent (Young, 1974). Hence it is also
positively involved and satisﬁes the Pareto condition. The median BC fMb, in contrast,
is not consistent. This is illustrated by Table 4, where the proﬁle above the middle
horizontal line denotes the proﬁle of V1 and that below the line depicts V2’s proﬁle.
The choice sets are {A,B} and {A}, respectively. Their intersection is obviously {A},
but fMb speciﬁes {A,B} as the choice set in V1∪V2.
The other median Borda variation, fMn is not consistent either. This is shown by
Table 5. The choice set from the proﬁle above the middle line is {A} and {A,C} from
the proﬁle below it, while the entire proﬁle of 6 voters ends up with {A,C}.
Young’s (1975) theorem on social choice scoring functions states that all anony-
mous, neutralandconsistentproceduresfailontheCondorcetwinningcriterion. Hence,
if the maximin method – which is anonymous and neutral – were consistent, it would
have to fail on the Condorcet winner criterion. Maximin is, however, not a scoring
rule. So, even though it fails on the Condorcet winner criterion, we are not entitled to
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the conclusion that it is inconsistent. Table 6, however, shows by way of an example
that it is inconsistent. The maximin choice set in the upper and lower parts consists of
A, while the choice from the entire 19 voter proﬁle is C.
Maximax rule is not consistent either. This is shown in Table 7. The maximax
choice sets are {C} and {A,C}, but the choice from the combined proﬁle is {A}.
Both geometric BC variations, fGb and fGn, in turn, are consistent. This results
from the observation that whenever the product of the Borda scores or outranking num-
bers are largest in V1 and in V2, the product of those products must also be larger than
the corresponding product for any other alternative.
Also Litvak’s method turns out to be inconsistent as shown by the example of
Table 8. Denote the part above the middle line as V1 and that below the middle line as
V2. Then the choice sets of V1, V2 and V are {B}, {A,B} and {A}, while consistency
would dictate {B} as the choice set from V.
Turning to faithfulness we observe that BC satisﬁes this property (Young, 1974).
So does fMb since the individual’s highest ranked alternative has trivially the highest
median Borda score, the second-ranked the next highest and so on. In contrast, fMn
is not faithful. This can be seen by considering a 3-alternative case and ignoring the
diagonal entries of the outranking matrix. The fMn choice set consists of the ﬁrst and
second ranked alternatives, a contradiction with faithfulness.
One of the geometric Borda variations is not faithful, viz. fGn. This is easily seen
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since all rows in the outranking matrix contain at least one zero with the sole exception
of the row that represents the ﬁrst-ranked alternative. Hence, the fGn ranking is a
dichotomous one: ﬁrst-ranked alternative ﬁrst with the rest forming a tie. The other
geometric variation fGb, on the other hand, is faithful since the collective ranking
coincides with that of the only individual forming the collectivity.
The maximin method fails on faithfulness as well since all rows except that corre-
sponding to the ﬁrst-ranked alternative contain a zero, whereby all these alternatives
tie for second place even in cases where the individual has a ranking without any ties.
Similarly, the maximax is not faithful either.
Litvak’s method, in its turn, is faithful as the individual’s ranking is at the shortest
distance from itself. Thus, this ranking is also the collective one.
Positive involvement is satisﬁed by BC since it is a scoring rule and satisﬁes faith-
fulness and consistency. The geometric Borda rule fGb – the rule that maximizes the
geometric average of the product of Borda points given to each alternative – is also
positively involved since adding an individual with preference ranking that coincides
with the collective one entails multiplying the score of the winning alternative with the
largest individual Borda score, the second-ranked alternative with the second largest
Borda point etc. Hence the new score of the winning alternative is larger than that of
any other alternative.
The other geometric version fGn is also positively involved. For suppose that a is
the ﬁrst ranked alternative in a proﬁle of V1 and then a group V2 of individuals with
identical preferences and a ﬁrst ranked joins the proﬁle. In the outranking matrix ofV1
alternative a’s column consists of zeros only. This is also the case in V2’s outranking
matrix. This means that the only row with non-diagonal entries all greater than zero in
V1∪V2 is a’s row. The product of its entries is then the only one that differs from zero.
Hence, a is elected by V1∪V2.
The median Borda variation, fMb, is not positively involved. This is shown in
Table 9. The upper part represents the V1 proﬁle where C wins. Adding now the lower
part proﬁle where C is ﬁrst ranked yields A the winner.
The median Borda variation fMn, in contrast, is positively involved. This follows
from the fact that the winning alternative a’s row elements in the outranking matrix
will be added by the number of individuals inV2. This means that the median entry on
a’s row in the outranking matrix ofV1∪V2 is added by the number of individuals inV2.
In other rows the entries will be added by |V2| or not at all. In these rows the median
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entries will be no larger than the corresponding median values in V1 plus |V1|. Hence
the choice of fMn remains the same after a group of identically minded individuals
with a their ﬁrst ranked alternative joins V1. Thus, fMn is positively involved.
Litvak’s method is positively involved. The proof can sketched as the following
reductio ad absurdum argument. Assume that a is the Litvak winner (i.e. ﬁrst ranked)
in V1. Assume, moreover, that V2 consists of individuals with identical preference
rankings so that a is ﬁrst in this consensus ranking. Finally, assume that the ranking
R where x 6= a is the one that is at the minimal (Litvak) distance from the rankings
in V1 and V2. The trick is to show that R can be improved upon, i.e. that it is not in
fact the ranking that is closest to the V1 and V2 rankings. This is seen by switching
a and x in R to obtain R0 and observing that R0 is closer to the rankings of V1 and V2
than R. Hence, R is not at minimal distance. Hence, the claim that Litvak’s method is
positively involved follows.
Also the maximin method is positively involved. If a wins in V1 and is joined by
V2 of individuals with identical preferences so that a is ﬁrst ranked, each entry of a’s
row in the outranking matrix of V1∪V2 is added by |V1∪V2|, while only some entries
of other rows are similarly added. Hence, the minimal entry on a’s row remains the
largest.
Similar argument shows that the maximax method is also positively involved.
4. Conclusion
Table 10 summarizes the results of the preceding. The main overall conclusion is that
BC beats the other systems discussed in this paper hands down in terms of the criteria
we have dealt with. A reader with a more “binary” or “Condorcetian” persuasion might
wonder why we haven’t included the Condorcet winning criterion into the picture.
This well-known condition states that if there is a Condorcet winner in the proﬁle
under investigation, this alternative should be chosen. Saari’s (e.g. Saari, 1995; Saari,
2006) works have cast a shadow over this criterion and, hence, we have not used it
here. Another reason is that the Condorcet winning criterion often plays a crucial
role in various incompatibility results – such as incompatibility of Condorcet criterion
and invulnerability to the no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988) or of Condorcet criterion
and nonmanipulability (G¨ ardenfors, 1976). Therefore, if the Condorcet criterion is in
doubt, much of the practical importance of these results is swept away.
Of course, it is not necessary to conduct project evaluations with BC or any of
its modiﬁcations. We re-emphasize, however, the intuitively appealing features of BC
in these contexts: all alternatives are handled neutrally, all voters anonymously and
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Table 10. Summary assessment of methods
Criterion method C-loser exclusion Consistency Faithfulness Positive involvement
BC yes yes yes yes
fMb no no yes no
fMn yes no no yes
fGb no yes yes yes
fGn no yes no yes
maximin no no no yes
maximax yes no no yes
Litvak no no yes yes
all positions have an equal value attached to them. Moreover, the difference between
values of two consecutive positions is constant. The well-known drawback of BC that
it is vulnerable to introduction of “phantom” options (irrelevant alternatives) can in the
project evaluation contexts be largely ignored since the contestant project set is usually
ﬁxed before the expert evaluation begins.
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